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INTRODUCTION
As this symposium and countless opinion pieces denouncing or

(less frequently) praising Citizens United v. FEC' illustrate, that ruling is
already regarded as extremely important. Yet, as I shall argue in this
Response, it is likely to have no more than a marginal practical effect.
Partly, that is for reasons identified by Professors Wert, Gaddie, and Bullock (hereinafter "WGB") in their symposium contribution. 2 As they explain, corporate fears of alienating customers by becoming too closely
associated with a political party or controversial political positions temper the corporate appetite for direct spending on politics-at least insofar
as such spending is visible to the public. 3
But there is also a more fundamental reason why Citizens United
will not substantially change the shape of American politics: Even before
Citizens United, corporations or, more precisely, persons and entities

with substantial accumulated wealth, already had, and frequently took
advantage of, the opportunity to exert enormous influence over American

politics, both directly and indirectly.
Before coming to that point, however, it will be useful to situate
Citizens United. Fortunately, the three principal papers in this symposium provide an excellent framework for considering how Citizens
United changed and, more importantly, did not change, the ability of
monied interests to influence politics.
* Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School. The Author thanks Steven
Shiffrin for very helpful comments on a draft of this Response.
1 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
2 See Justin J. Wert, Ronald Keith Gaddie & Charles S. Bullock, III, Of Benedick and
Beatrice: Citizens United and the Reign of the Laggard Court, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
469 (2011).
3 See id. at 727 ("Political action beyond . . . highly technical policy concerns can actually serve to imperil the primary objective of any firm, which is keeping clients and
customers.").
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The balance of this Response proceeds in five Parts. Part I examines Professor Gardner's intriguing suggestion that the extremity of the
position the Court took in Citizens United-and has taken more generally with respect to campaign spending-bespeaks fear of a slippery
slope.4 In his view, that fear is unreasonable, and I agree, although I
suggest that the logic Gardner perceives may not provide the best causal
account of the Court's rigid campaign spending doctrine.
Part II turns to the argument of WGB. They contend that Citizens
United is best understood as the effort of a "laggard Court" that trails the
policy preferences of the general public. 5 I believe their thesis to be
correct in its broad strokes but that, like much of the otherwise highly
illuminating work on the Court by political scientists, it glosses over important matters of nuance because it fails to distinguish between general
political ideology and distinctively judicial ideology.
Part III considers Professor Briffault's contribution. 6 He argues that
Citizens United did not break substantially new ground in protecting corporate speech but that the decision is troubling in other respects.7 Briffault thus fears that Citizens United could herald a substantial tightening
of the Court's campaign finance jurisprudence; the result would be the
demise of soft-money restrictions and perhaps even the reasonable limits
on campaign contributions that have been held permissible since Buckley
v. Valeo.8
In Briffault's view, to focus on corporations as such misses the real
story, which is the effect that large concentrations of wealth can have on
politics-whether in the hands of corporations, other artificial entities, or
natural persons. 9 I agree entirely. But where Briffault largely faults the
Court's doctrines for opening too many opportunities for money to affect
politics, I would go further to note that no regime of campaign finance
consistent with free speech can realistically hope to contain the impact of
concentrated wealth on our political economy.
Accordingly, Part IV explains why Citizens United is ultimately
small potatoes. The regime of campaign finance regulation pre-Citizens
United was so full of loopholes that adding this additional one did not
materially alter it. But that fact is, in turn, only partly due to the Supreme Court's strongly libertarian campaign finance doctrine, before or
after Citizens United. The impact of concentrated wealth on politics can
4 See James A. Gardner, Anti-Regulatory Absolutism in the Campaign Arena: Citizens
United and the Implied Slippery Slope, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. PoL'Y 469, 673 (2011).

5 See Wert et al., supra note 2, at 719.
6 See Richard A. Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity: Campaign Finance After Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 469, 643 (2011).
7 See id.

8 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (per curiam).
9 Briffault, supra note 6, at 670-71.
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be seen in areas quite far afield from what we would ordinarily deem
political speech-especially in ordinary commercial advertising.
Part V concludes this apparently depressing picture of American political life with a caution against nihilism or apathy. If concentrated
wealth prevents the realization of the perfect pre-conditions for citizen
deliberation, that does not mean that all efforts to limit the damage from
such wealth are in vain. Here, as elsewhere, the best should not become
the enemy of the good.
I.

GARDNER'S SLIPPERY SLOPE

In his insightful contribution to this symposium, Professor Gardner
observes and offers an explanation for an apparent puzzle. Why, Gardner asks, has the Supreme Court's campaign spending regulation jurisprudence settled on an extreme point in the spectrum of doctrinal
possibilities? Whereas other constitutional doctrines announce balancing
tests or difficult-but-not-impossible-to-satisfy levels of judicial scrutiny,
when it comes to campaign spending, the Court has chosen an absolute
prohibition. He says that "the Court and its strongest supporters ... take
the position that no regulation of campaign spending may be permitted .

.

. as a matter of constitutional law."1 o

What could explain such an extreme position?, Gardner asks. His
answer is that the Justices in the majority in Citizens United and similar
cases fear a slippery slope." However, Gardner goes on to argue that the
fear is unrealistic. Downhill from the Court's absolute stance, there are
both doctrinal and practical plateaus on which legal principles and campaign spending regulations respectively could safely come to rest, thus
halting the slide to direct suppression of dissent, loss of public information needed for democratic deliberation, or incumbent entrenchmentthe three fears that might be motivating the Justices to adopt a categorical stance against campaign spending regulations.
If indeed the Court worries about the slippery slopes Gardner identifies, then his analysis strikes me as exactly right. For the reasons he
identifies, the fears are unrealistic. However, Gardner is less persuasive
in showing either that the relevant constitutional doctrine really does occupy an extreme point on the regulatory spectrum or that, to the extent it
could be said to do so, fears of a slippery slope explain the doctrine.
Gardner's claim that "the Court's approach in campaign spending
cases [occupies] the most extreme position available" 12 rests initially on
the use of a quite narrow lens. After all, the Court's cases concerning
10

Gardner, supra note 4, at 685.
11 Id. at 676.
12 Id. at 675.
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campaign finance regulation as a whole do not take the most extreme
position possible.
As everyone who works in this field knows, since Buckley, the doctrine has distinguished between campaign spending restrictions and campaign contribution limits. The doctrine governing the latter is not so
extreme. Even applying what the Buckley Court called its "rigorous standard of review," the Justices upheld a contribution limit of $1,000.00 in
1976 dollars. 13 To be sure, as the Court indicated in 2006, substantially
lower maximum contribution limits do violate the First Amendment., 14
but that only shows that in eschewing the ostensibly extreme anti-regulatory position avowed in its spending cases, the Court's contribution cases
do not go all the way to the other extreme; they settle on a point that
allows substantial, though not unlimited regulation.
Taken together, the Court's contribution and expenditure cases present a mixed pattern. That is especially true when one adds disclosure
requirements to the mix, as the Court has consistently upheld mandatory
disclosure under a relatively lenient standard of scrutiny.15 If the Court
were really concerned about the slippery slopes to which Gardner points,
then one would expect to see it staking out an extreme anti-regulatory
position across the range of campaign finance regulations, rather than
simply with respect to campaign spending.
Perhaps Gardner could reformulate his thesis as a hypothesis about
the most conservative Justices rather than the Court as a whole. After
all, those Justices have called for overruling the application of less-thanstrict scrutiny to campaign contribution limits. 1 6 And, as Professor Briffault's contribution notes, Citizens United may hasten the day when
Buckley falls.17
But even then, it is worth noting that the Court's conservatives do
not expressly call for a no-regulation regime when it comes to expenditures. Further, they would still allow disclosure requirements, as Citizens
United itself illustrates.18 And for at least some of the conservatives, the
strict scrutiny they would apply to contribution limits in the wake of
Buckley's demise might not be invariably fatal in fact.19
13 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 29.

14 See Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 250 (2006) (plurality opinion) (invalidating contribution limits that, when inflation is considered, allowed only slightly more than one-twentieth of the limits upheld in Buckley).
15 See id.; Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
16 See, e.g., Nixon, 528 U.S. at 410 (Thomas, J., joined by Scalia, J., dissenting) (calling
for overruling Buckley's approach to contribution limits).
17 Briffault, supra note 6, at 652.

18 See Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 916 (2010).
19 See Nixon, 528 U.S. at 409-10 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (calling for overruling Buckley, though leaving open the possibility of "some limits on both expenditures and contributions"); cf Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term: Foreword: In Search of Evolving
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At the same time, Gardner's own devastating critique of the slippery-slope rationales for a no-regulation regime casts considerable doubt
on the possibility that the slippery-slope fears really explain the extremity of the Court's approach to campaign spending limits. Thus, we ought
to cast about for an alternative causal explanation for the shape of the
doctrine. In my view, some combination of doctrinal inertia and ideological preferences best explains the case law.
By "doctrinal inertia," I mean that the Buckley Court put limits on
campaign expenditures in the box of direct limits on speech that are thus
subject to strict scrutiny, and that no majority has yet coalesced around
an agreed-upon alternative. In deciding constitutional cases, the Supreme Court frequently and understandably adapts categories it has already developed, rather than creating wholly new ones. Thus, once the
Court decided that limits on campaign expenditures infringed on freedom
of speech, it was natural for the Court to use the doctrinal tools it had
already developed for other sorts of infringements on speech.
Doctrinal inertia explains why we need no special causal account of
the odd fact that the Citizens United Court treats corporate speech as
almost especially valuable. Gardner criticizes the Justices for fearing a
slippery slope given what he regards as the content-neutrality of campaign expenditure limits. 20 Yet he fails to note that the Court's standard
doctrines treat speaker-based limits on speech as no better than contentbased limits. 2 1 The Court makes the point at a crucial juncture in the
Citizens United opinion, stating: "Quite apart from the purpose or effect
of regulating content, . . . the Government may commit a constitutional

wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers." 22 For the
majority, the core flaw in the challenged provision at issue in Citizens
United was that it "impose[d] restrictions on certain disfavored speakers," 2 3 namely corporate speakers. 2 4
But, it will be objected, surely the Court made a choice to treat
limits on corporate independent expenditures as speaker-based in the
same way as speaker-based limits outside the context of corporate speech
and campaign speech. The objection is valid but misses the point. The
majority Justices were no doubt aware of the possibility of stuffing corDoctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 8

(1972) (contending that strict scrutiny in his day "was 'strict' in theory, fatal in fact").
20 See Gardner, supra note 4, at 695 ("Limitations on campaign spending . . . are by

definition content-neutral . . . .").
21 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Victims Crime Bd.,
502 U.S. 105 (1991).
22 Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 899.
23 Id.

24 See id at 902 ("[T]he Government cannot restrict political speech based on the
speaker's corporate identity.") (citing First Nat'l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765
(1978)).
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porate campaign expenditures into a different doctrinal pigeonhole, or of
creating (or, more accurately, of retaining25) a separate pigeonhole for
corporate campaign expenditures, but that only tells us that doctrinal inertia does not function in an ideological vacuum. For conservative Justices who are generally distrustful of regulation-and especially
distrustful of regulations that have greater support among political liberals than among political conservatives-ideological preferences were
sufficient to block any impulse they might otherwise have felt to attempt
to overcome doctrinal inertia.
Thus, Gardner's (modified) hypothesis that the (conservative wing
of the) Court is motivated by ultimately misguided fears of slippery
slopes is unnecessary. Occam's razor points instead to a much more
straightforward explanation: The doctrine since Buckley readily allowed
the result the Court reached in Citizens United; given the ideological
druthers of the dominant conservative wing of the Court, there was no
reason for these Justices not to follow the doctrine where it led them.
H.

WGB's

LAGGARD COURT

If my critique of Gardner sounds too much in legal realism, let me
assure the reader that it is meant to be only partly so. Ideological
druthers alone rarely beget Supreme Court decisions. One also needs
doctrinal space. Thus, to my mind, WGB err in analyzing the campaign
finance decisions of the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts in almost exclusively partisan political terms. Where, as in the area of campaign finance, we see the Court acting contrary to the contemporary political
will, WGB explain the phenomenon in terms of the party politics that
gave rise to the current Court-namely, "three decades of Republican
Party efforts to remake the Supreme Court in its own image." 26
WGB rightly seek insights from the political science literature on
the Court, which accounts for most of the variance among the voting
patterns of different Justices by using ideological categories from the political domain. WGB endorse the "attitudinal" model in its most extreme
form: "When the Court advances purportedly legal, as opposed to overtly
political reasoning," they say, "this is simply window dressing designed
to ensure the legitimacy of the judicial function as it conforms its decisions to the dominant political coalition." 2 7 Yet whether housed in law
schools under the heading of "critical legal studies" or in political sci25 See Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990), overruled by Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. 876.

26 Wert et al., supra note 2, at 732.
27 Id. at 729.
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ence departments under the heading of the "attitudinal model," 2 8 this
view is too crude-as one of the chief examples chosen by WGB itself
demonstrates.
WGB invoke the Rehnquist and Roberts Court jurisprudence
under-and in adjudicating challenges to-the Voting Rights Act, as
supposed evidence of the Court's political leanings. 29 They are correct
that the Justices predictably divide in these cases along a conservative/
liberal axis. But the division is a distinctively jurisprudentialsplit, not
simply politics by other means.
Consider the majority-minority districts that a conservative majority
in Shaw v. Reno30 and its progeny frequently invalidated. On net, these
districts probably benefited the Republican Party. "There is a reasonably
good case to be made that the post-1990 creation of majority-minority
districts has helped the Republican party by concentrating black voters in
a relatively small number of districts rather than systematically diluting
them as was done in the past."3 1 Yet despite the advantage that packing
African Americans into majority-minority districts conferred on Republicans in the surrounding correspondingly whiter, and thus more Republican, districts, the Court's most conservative members were most hostile
to these districts. These Justices were undoubtedly influenced by their
conservative judicial ideology-especially their commitment to colorblindness-but they were not voting the party line.
Other cases cited by WGB are to the same effect. For example,
they refer in passing to the decision in City of Boerne v. Flores,32 in
which the Court's most conservative Justices voted to invalidate the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA) as applied to the states. Yet
with broad bipartisan support among the public, RFRA had passed the
House by voice vote and passed the Senate nearly unanimously. 33 If the
Court's conservatives were representing Republicans-or any other political constituency for that matter-they would not have invalidated
RFRA. More broadly, the preference of the conservative Justices of the
28 See, e.g., JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE

ArrITUDINAL MODEL REVISITED passim (2002) (classifying Supreme Court decisions and Jus-

tices on the basis of categories that largely correspond with contemporary American left-right
political divisions).
29 See Wert et al., supra note 2, at 732-36.
30 509 U.S. 630 (1993).
31 David A. Bositis, The Future of Majority-Minority Districts and Black and Hispanic
Legislative Representation, in REDISTRICTING AND MINORITY REPRESENTATION: LEARNING
FROM THE PAST, PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 9, 9 (David A. Bositis ed., 1998).

32 521 U.S. 507 (1997), cited by Wert et al., supra note 2, at _ [draft at 20].
33 See Robert F. Drinan & Jennifer I. Huffman, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act:
A Legislative History, 10 J.L. & RELIGION 531, 538 (1993-1994). Only three Senators, includ-

ing only one Republican (North Carolina Senator Jesse Helms), voted against RFRA. See U.S.
Senate Roll Call Vote No. 331, 103rd Cong, 1st Sess. (Oct. 27, 1993).
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Rehnquist and the Roberts Court for restraining federal power is princi-

pally a matter of distinctly judicialideology rather than partisan or otherwise political ideology. 34
Even with respect to the core issue addressed in this symposiumregulation of campaign finance-the WGB approach lacks sufficient nuance to capture the subtle differences between political and legal issues.
Today, political conservatives are more likely to oppose restrictions on
campaign finance, but it was not always so. Buckley itself garnered the
votes of iconic liberal Justices Brennan and Marshall,3 5 and even today
the issue does not divide neatly along a left/right political axis. The
American Civil Liberties Union-perhaps the most prominent liberal
NGO in the country-opposes much campaign finance regulation, and
filed a brief urging the Court to invalidate Section 203 of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act (BCRA), 3 6 the key provision at issue in Citizens
United.3 7 So did the nation's largest and leading labor organization. 38
And although the most recent Democratic appointee to the Court did her
duty as Solicitor General by pressing arguments for sustaining the law
challenged in Citizens United, as an academic she vigorously defended
judicial skepticism of equality as a rationale for campaign finance
regulation. 39
Conversely, BCRA itself is popularly known by the name of its two
chief sponsors (McCain-Feingold), one of whom, Senator John McCain,
was the Republican nominee in the last Presidential election. Against the
backdrop of this quite jumbled political landscape, it surely oversimplifies matters to see in Citizens United or in the Court's campaign finance
34 See Michael C. Dorf, Whose Ox is Being Gored? When Attitudinalism Meets Federal-

ism, 21 ST. JoHN's J. LEGAL COMMENT. 497 (2007) (arguing that judicial attitudes about federalism contain a distinctly legal, as opposed to political, element).
35 Within the Court, Justices Brennan and Marshall, along with Justice White, were more
receptive than some of their colleagues to the notion that campaign finance restrictions could
serve First Amendment values. See Richard L. Hasen, The Untold Drafting History of Buckley v. Valeo, 2 ELECTON L.J. 241, 243 (2003). However, they did ultimately fully join (and in
Brennan's case substantially contribute to) the per curiam opinion in Buckley.
36 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-155, § 203, 116 Stat. 81,
91-92 (2002) (codified with some difference in language at 2 U.S.C. § 441b); see Citizens
United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876, 887-88 (2010) (explaining the changes wrought by BCRA
§ 203).
37 See Amicus Curiae Brief of American Civil Liberties Union in Support of Appellant
on Supplemental Question, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009) (No. 08-205), 2009
WL 2365203.
38 See Brief of the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations as Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellant, Citizens United v. FEC, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2009)
(No. 08-205), 2009 WL 2365216.
39 See Elena Kagan, PrivateSpeech, Public Purpose: The Role of Government Motive in

First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. CI. L. REV. 413, 471 (1996) ("[T]he goal of equalization
often and well conceals what does conflict with the First Amendment: the passage of laws
tainted with ideological, and especially with self-interested, motivations.").
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jurisprudence more broadly a battle between Republican opponents and
Democratic proponents of campaign finance regulation.
In short, WGB are not wrong to see the play of ideology in the
Court's campaign finance cases, but that should be the beginning point of
analysis, not the end point. For anyone interested in understanding the
why and how of the law in this area-as in just about all other areasthe important questions concern how judicial ideology differs from political ideology (which is itself polyphonic), and how those differences
cash out in terms of doctrinal rules.
III.

BRIFFAULT'S PORTENTS

Professor Briffault takes up just the right doctrinal questions in his
contribution. He offers two key insights. First, Briffault observes that
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion in Citizens United adopts a very narrow definition of the sort of "corruption" that campaign finance regulation may legitimately target. 40 Indeed, Citizens United employs the very
definition of corruption Justice Kennedy had previously championed in
dissent in McConnell v. FEC.4 1 Thus, Briffault worries that Citizens
United could lead to the wholesale substitution of Justice Kennedy's
views about soft money for those of the McConnell majority.
Second, Briffault worries about the Citizens United Court's signals
regarding complexity. The majority indicates that the complexity of a
campaign-regulatory regime counts against that regime's constitutionality because of the chill exerted on speech by complex rules and standards.42 However, as Briffault explains, given the risks of evasion, all
campaign finance restrictions are necessarily complex, perhaps becoming
increasingly complex over time. 43 If the complexity of a campaign finance regulatory scheme itself raises First Amendment questions, Briffault notes, then all campaign finance regulation could be
unconstitutional.
These are serious worries, and if they come to pass that would mark
an important turning point in American campaign finance regulation.
Certainly the ability of wealthy individuals, corporations, and other entities to give unlimited funds directly to candidates could dramatically
change the nature of campaigning and even governance. However, one
must bear in mind that these are implications and inferences that Profes40 See id. at 446-47; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 908-11 (limiting the anticorruption rationale of campaign finance regulation to targeting quid pro quo arrangements).
41 540 U.S. 93, 292 (2003) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (describing the Buckley anti-corruption rationale as targeting quid pro quo
corruption).
42 See Briffault, supra note 6, at 663-65; see also Citizens United, 130 S. Ct. at 895-96.

43 See id. at 665-66.

748

CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 20:739

sor Briffault draws from the logic of Citizens United, rather than doctrinal changes wrought by the case itself.
If anything, Briffault's analysis confirms that Citizens Unitedviewed as a doctrinal signpost rather than as a harbinger-is not especially consequential. Long before Citizens United, corporations were understood to have some rights under the Constitution. 44 Whatever one
thinks about that proposition as a general matter, the First Amendment's
protection for "freedom of speech" rather than for freedom of any particular speaker, combined with the fact that media companies are often embedded in larger corporate conglomerates, would make any categorical
effort to deny constitutional protection to corporate speakers problematic. Where Citizens United broke new ground with respect to corporate
speech was in overruling Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce,45
insofar as that case allowed the distorting impact of independent expenditures by corporations to stand as a compelling interest in campaign finance cases. 46 But Austin itself was always best seen as something of an
outlier, in light of the Court's declaration in Buckley that "the concept
that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society
in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment." 4 7 As with the rest of the Citizens United opinion, the
delivery of the final coup de grace to Austin is more worrisome for what
it may portend than for what it does.
IV.

CONCENTRATED WEALTH'S UBIQUITOUS EFFECTS

Put differently, even before Citizens United, large corporations, as
well as other wealthy natural and artificial persons, enjoyed enormous
opportunities to spend funds to influence politics. These opportunities
included and still include direct influence on public debate and, less noticed but probably of greater importance, indirect influence.
First, consider what BCRA allowed even before Citizens United. In
FEC v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. (WRTL), 4 8 the Court held that
BCRA's ban on independent corporate expenditures for "electioneering
communications" was unconstitutional insofar as it applied beyond the
narrow category of speech that is the "functional equivalent" of "express
advocacy" for or against a particular candidate. 49 Thus, without violating BCRA, a corporation could spend millions of dollars on issue adver44 See Cnty of Santa Clara v. S. Pac. R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
45 494 U.S. 652 (1990).

46 See id. at 660 (finding a compelling interest in limiting the unfairness of corporations
using their state-conferred benefits to underwrite campaign speech).
47 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,48-49 (2010) (per curiam); see also Austin, 494 U.S. at
685 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting this language from Buckley).
48 551 U.S. 449 (2007).
49 See id. at 452.
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tising right up through election day, even taking clear sides on issues
closely associated with particular candidates. Indeed, that result would
have been evident even before WRTL. That case gave a narrow definition to campaign speech, but issue advertising by corporations, other artificial entities, and natural persons would have been protected speech
under any view advanced by any Justice ever to sit on the Court in the
modem era of campaign finance regulation. Ordinary issue advocacywhether or not it occurs during an election campaign-simply is protected speech.
WGB note that over the last two decades, corporations have not
used political action committees (PACs) to fund independent expenditures, thus suggesting the lack of a corporate appetite for such expenditures.50 That may be, but not because corporations have no appetite for
influencing public debate. On the contrary, the most plausible explanation for corporate indifference to the opportunities PACs provide for independent expenditures may well be that they are substantially less
effective than the other means at their disposal.
Consider issue advertising accomplished through 527 organizations
funded by labor unions, wealthy individuals, and corporations or trade
groups. 5 ' With a recent peak of contributions and expenditures totaling
about $400 million in 2004,52 such organizations provide pools of concentrated wealth the opportunity to influence public opinion before and
during an election period. By way of comparison, consider that in the
2008 Presidential election, general election public funding for each major
party candidates was $84.1 million. 53 Because that figure was so low
compared to how much money could be raised through private donations-even given the limits on individual contributions-candidate
Obama reneged on an earlier pledge to accept public funding to free himself of the spending limit that comes as a condition on public funding.54
50 See Wert et al., supra note 2, at 724 (Figure 1).

51 In each of the last four federal election cycles (including 2010), by far the largest
contributor to 527 organizations was the Service Employees International Union (SEW), with
other union groups also well represented near the top of the list. See Top Contributors to
Federally Focused 527 Organizations, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://

www.opensecrets.org/527s/527contribs.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2011). In 2004, for example,
SE1U contributed over $50 million to federally-focused 527 organizations. See id. Persons
and entities falling within each of the other categories are also well represented on the lists.
See id.
52 See 527s: Advocacy Group Spending in the 2010 Elections, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE
POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.org/527s/index.php#cmtes

(last visited Jan. 14, 2011).

53 See Presidential Spending Limits for 2008, FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION, http://

www.fec.gov/pages/brochures/pubfund_limits_2008.shtml (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
54 See Adam Nagourney & Jeff Zeleny, Obama Forgoes Public Money in Firstfor Ma-

2
jor Candidate, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2008, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/ 0/us/politics/
20obamacnd.html.
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As President, Obama has been an awkward messenger for the view
that money improperly influences politics. Obama fueled a brief controversy when he called out the Supreme Court for its Citizens United decision in his 2010 State of the Union Address (and when Justice Alito,
seated in the audience, appeared to disagree with Obama's characterization of the case).55 But perhaps more important than Obama's condemnation of Citizens United has been his willingness to work within the
existing system. The starkest example was a corrupt bargain the President struck with the Pharmaceutical Research and Manufacturers of
America (PhRMA) regarding health care reform.
In August 2009, the White House struck a deal to enlist the pharmaceutical industry in support of its health care reform efforts. 5 6 PhRMA
agreed that it would give $80 billion worth of discounts to patients over
ten years.5 7 It further agreed to spend $150 million for advertising in
support of the President's plan.5 8 In exchange, the White House agreed
that savings from drug discounts would be capped at the $80 billion; the
government would not use its purchasing power to negotiate deeper price
cuts. 59 That deal did not merely create the appearance of a quid pro quo.
It was an admitted quid pro quo-and apparently perfectly legal, perhaps
even constitutionally protected speech on the part of PhRMA, which, in
light of the promised cap, was motivated to spend $150 million to persuade voters that the reform effort was not only good for PhARMA but
good for American health. 60
More generally, lobbying was and remains another gigantic outlet
for money in politics. Although the tax code restricts the deductibility of
donations made to organizations that engage in lobbying, 6 1 federal law
does not limit the amount of money that persons, corporations, or other
entities may spend on lobbying. Thus, after a decade of yearly increases,
in 2009, all persons and entities combined spent $3.5 billion on lobbying
Congress and federal agencies. 62 These activities were legal before and
after BCRA and, as with issue advertising, any serious effort to restrict
lobbying on the expenditure side (as opposed to ethical rules barring
government officials from accepting gifts) would run afoul of the First
55 Barack Obama, 2010 State of The Union Address, STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS

LIBRARY, http://stateoftheunionaddress.org/2010-barack-obama (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
56 See David D. Kirkpatrick, White House Affirms Deal on Drug Cost, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.

6, 2009, at Al.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.

61 See 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4) (2006).
62 See Lobbying Database, CENTER FOR RESPONSIVE POLITICS, http://www.opensecrets.

org/lobby/index.php (last visited Jan. 14, 2011).
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Amendment, even as understood by the Supreme Court's most campaign-finance-regulation-friendly Justices.
Finally, consider commercial advertising. Even in the grip of a
deep recession that caused advertisers to shift their efforts overseas, in
2008 the one hundred firms that spent the most money on advertising
globally spent $44.4 billion on commercial advertising in the United
States 63-a sum that simply dwarfs political advertising. That speech
was basically one-sided. With respect to some political issues, we may
be able to count on corporate spending and union spending to more or
less balance out, but the same cannot typically be said with respect to
commercial advertising. Tepid efforts to advance public health through,
for example, requirements that restaurateurs list calorie counts 6 4 have
difficulty competing with the fast-food industry's spending of over $4
billion on television advertising in 2009.65
The ability of commercial advertisers to influence consumer preferences directly provides a layer of insurance against legal action. A nation conditioned by commercial advertisers to regard driving as freedom
itself 66 will predictably oppose increasing the gasoline tax as a means of
discouraging driving-and thus even politicians who do not receive substantial material support from the automobile and oil industries will not
likely propose such a tax increase. Commercial advertising not only occurs on a much larger scale than expressly political advertising; it may be
all the more effective for seeming apolitical, operating to construct the
culture in which politics and everything else occurs. 67
In a country already awash in billions of dollars worth of commercial advertising and a smaller, but still enormous amount of money for
lobbying and political advertising, the changes wrought by Citizens
United are very small potatoes.

63 See Laurel Wentz & Bradley Johnson, Top 100 GlobalAdvertisers Heap Their Spending Abroad; Focused 62% of Budgets Outside the U.S. Last Year, with Much Going to China,
ADVERTISING AGE, Nov. 30, 2009, at 1.
64 See Devon E. Winkles, Comment: Weighing the Value of Information: Why the Federal Government Should Require Nutrition Labeling for Food Served in Restaurants, 59 EM-

ORY L.J. 549, 554-55 (2009) (describing state and local laws).
65 See Noreen O'Leary, They're Lovin' It, ADWEEK, May 3, 2010, at 20.
66 Once again, the numbers are telling. Even after substantial declines due to the recession, in 2008, automakers and auto dealers spent $10 billion on television advertising. See
Steve McLellan, Chrysler Fallout Sign of Things to Come? Auto Giant's Bankruptcy May
Signal Fewer Upfront Dollars, ADWEEK, May 4, 2009, at 6.
67 For a now-classic account of the role of commercial advertising in constituting consumerism, see STEWART EWEN, CAPTAINS OF CONSCIOUSNEss: ADVERTISING AND THE SOCIAL
ROOTS OF THE CONSUMER CULTURE (Basic Books 25th Anniv. ed. 2001) (1976).
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CONCLUSION
To those people who worry about the health of American politics,
the bottom line I urge here may seem utterly bleak: Do not worry about
Citizens United ruining American politics with barrels of cash; American
politics was mostly ruined already. Yet I would resist a counsel of despair. Even if only at the margin, campaign finance regulation can create
better and worse regimes.
More broadly, we can sensibly distinguish between flawed democracies and fundamentally non-democratic states like North Korea or the
former Soviet Union. For all of its flaws, the United States retains a
basically democratic system of government. And as Professor Gardner
shows, there is no realistic likelihood that BCRA-style campaign finance
regulation will place the United States on an inevitable road to serfdom.
What should make the decision in Citizens United so galling, therefore,
is not that it handed government over to corporate money. Quite the
contrary. The decision offends precisely because it was so unnecessary
for securing the place of moneyed interests in American politics.
In an important regard, WGB may have things exactly backwards.
Of course they are right that the Roberts Court is a "laggard" in the sense
that its conservative bloc was appointed by past Republican Presidents.
But in asserting the rights of capital in their most extreme form, the conservative bloc of the Court aims to capture the spirit of a very current
political movement that regards just about any regulation of the economy
as "socialist." If that movement succeeds, the Roberts Court could come
to be seen not as a laggard from the Reagan era but in the vanguard of
the Tea Party era. Thus, whether the Court lags or leads politics may
well depend on whether one looks back or forward.

